Broadly described as ‘the social life of concepts‘, my work spans the fields of social and political theory, sociology of knowledge/social epistemology, political philosophy and political economy, and philosophy of (social) science. More specifically, I research the relationship between modes of knowing about the world (that is, ideas, institutions, and practices of knowledge production), and modes of being in the world (how they relate to economic, political and affective regimes). I am interested in how these come together, not only in making the world as it is, but also in how it could and should be. This has implications for questions such as the relationship between knowledge/expertise and the climate crisis, prediction and knowing about the future, but also personal decisions about what we owe others in contexts of political, economic, and social change.
My current research can be grouped into three strands:
(1) Non-reciprocity: a social and political theory
What do we not owe others? Most contemporary theories see reciprocity as the norm, whether as ‘natural’ (concepts such as ‘ubuntu’, altruism, or ethics of care) or as in need of fostering via social and political arrangements or policies (‘freerider problem’, ‘tragedy of the commons’). Conversely, the only positive framing of non-reciprocity in social and political theory occurs when reciprocity is seen as threatening the survival, maintenance, or reproduction of the social (e.g. ‘turning the other cheek’ as non-reciprocating violence). But are there other contexts where non-reciprocity is justified? For instance, do we owe obedience to states that do not tax companies that pollute drinking water?
My current project, Uncategorical imperatives: understanding nonreciprocity (supported by the Leverhulme Trust), develops this question in political and social theory (and practice). It traces its origins in political philosophy and intellectual history, and engages with its applications in three contemporary arenas of social and political life: free speech and academic freedom (‘free speech wars’, freedom of expression, ‘no platforming’); public health (mitigation vs. adaptation in cases like pandemics or effects of climate change); and interpersonal relationships (ethics of monogamy & nonmonogamy, friendships vs. romantic relationships, and consent). Its objective is to map the contours of the social beyond reciprocity.
For short(er) reflections, see here, here and here.
(2) Thhe social life of the mind
This project engages with the question of collectivity (collective agents, collective intentionality) from the perspective of intentional communities of thought. Starting from the premise that knowledge production is inevitably, constitutively, and irreducibly social, it asks: what is the relationship between ‘life of the mind’ and political plurality? Thinkers like Hannah Arendt associated thinking with solitude, contrasting it with political life (life in the polis), even as its prerequisite; liberal political theory associated it with preparation for virtuous participation in a political community. Even if this sequentialist account ever held true, it makes sense to recognize ‘thought’ today happens against an already crowded and socialized backdrop, including that of digital platforms & social media, ‘free speech wars’, and ‘fake news’; it is also structured by and continues to structure forms of inequality, exclusion, and distribution of resources both material and intellectual. Rather than accepting the diagnostic of more and pure(r) thought as the remedy for the transfigurations of liberal democracy, this project engages with the possibility of irreducible and irreconcilable political plurality as simultaneously limit and durable condition of the life of the mind, and asks what it means to ‘think together’ – that is, coexist with others in spaces of thought – under such circumstances, and what kind of collective action can spring from them.
Interested in learning more? See this text, my talk at the Hannah Arendt Center at Bard College in May 2023, this article on free speech and academic freedom, this article on epistemic positioning and epistemic injustice, or anything else I’ve written.
(3) I am also continuing/building on/wrapping up research strands from the period between 2020 and 2022:
- Relationship between knowledge, prediction, and agency
Both policy and everyday discourses assume the link between knowledge and agency. That is, increased awareness of the causes as well as consequences of specific occurrences, objects, or events, is assumed to correlate with a wider scope of possible reactions in relation to them. How do social systems for mediating knowledge and expertise – from education institutions to social media – interact with this link? What kind of narrative and methodological devices do they generate or use? What kind of futures do they envisage – and, concomitantly, what kind of futures do they prevent us from seeing? What does the context of pluralisation of ‘legitimate’ ways of knowing (and the disputes surrounding validity of knowledge) mean for how people act and reflect on their actions?
For my work in this area, see this article on Covid-19, or politics of disciplinary knowledge in late liberalism here.
- Relationship between epistemological and moral-political aspects of knowledge claims
How do epistemic positions map onto moral or political projects? What is the (explicit or implicit) moral value of knowledge? How do different disciplines and institutions of knowledge production present, justify, and negotiate their value, power, and authority? Simultaneously, how do different forms of epistemic positioning shape or contribute to social inequalities, including class, gender and ethnicity/race?
For longer reflections on these topics, see here, here or here.
My broader theoretical project involves building a relational ontology of knowledge production. The relational ontology of knowledge production combines elements of existentialist philosophy and ethics with feminist, indigenous, and standpoint epistemologies. It centres the relationship between knowledge producers (or epistemic subjects) and collective, institutional, and material arrangements of knowledge production to reflect on questions of authority, reflexivity and self-knowledge (or self-ignorance) as well as their moral, ethical, and political implications. These implications concern topics such as climate change, Open Access, public engagement or expertise. This article in Social Epistemology offers a theoretical summary of some of these arguments, as does the accompanying blog post.
Jana Bacevic 